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ABSTRACT
China is one of the largest Androidmarkets in theworld. As Chinese
users cannot access Google Play to buy and install Android apps,
a number of independent app stores have emerged and compete
in the Chinese app market. Some of the Chinese app stores are
pre-installed vendor-specific app markets (e.g.,Huawei, Xiaomi and
OPPO), whereas others are maintained by large tech companies
(e.g., Baidu, Qihoo 360 and Tencent). The nature of these app stores
and the content available through them vary greatly, including their
trustworthiness and security guarantees.
As of today, the research community has not studied the Chinese
Android ecosystem in depth. To fill this gap, we present the first
large-scale comparative study that covers more than 6 million An-
droid apps downloaded from 16 Chinese app markets and Google
Play. We focus our study on catalog similarity across app stores,
their features, publishing dynamics, and the prevalence of various
forms of misbehavior (including the presence of fake, cloned and
malicious apps). Our findings also suggest heterogeneous developer
behavior across app stores, in terms of code maintenance, use of
third-party services, and so forth. Overall, Chinese app markets
perform substantially worse when taking active measures to pro-
tect mobile users and legit developers from deceptive and abusive
actors, showing a significantly higher prevalence of malware, fake,
and cloned apps than Google Play.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems → Web mining; • Security and pri-
vacy→Mobile and wireless security; • Networks→Mobile
networks;
KEYWORDS
App ecosystem, Android market, malware, cloned app, third-party
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1 INTRODUCTION
According to recent reports, there are more than 700 million An-
droid users in China [84]. Due to the restriction of Google’s services
in China since late 2010 – and by extension of Google Play [46, 73]
– hundreds of millions of Chinese Android users resort to alterna-
tive markets to buy and install Android apps. This restriction over
Google services in China has been seen as a business opportunity
by many Chinese Internet companies (e.g., Tencent and Baidu) and
smartphone manufacturers (e.g., Huawei and Xiaomi). Despite the
fact that these app markets target mainly the Chinese Android
users, they are also available to users from all over the world.
The diversity and large number of third-party markets in China
have made it difficult for both mobile users and app developers to
choose the most appropriate one(s) to discover or distribute their
apps. This state of affairs has also opened new opportunities for
malicious actors: previous work has suggested that repackaged
apps, including malware, are widely distributed in Google Play, but
especially through third-party markets [52, 53, 57, 58, 60, 89, 102].
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has performed
a systematic and comparative study across different app markets,
including the Chinese ones. To fill this research gap, we perform
a multi-dimensional and large-scale study covering more than 6.2
million apps to identify the differences between Google Play and
16 popular Chinese Android app markets. We begin our study by
offering a high-level characterization of these app stores, discussing
features such as their copyright checks, app auditing processes, their
strategies to attract app developers, and their transparency efforts
(Section 2). Second, after presenting our dataset and app collection
method (Section 3), we compare their download distributions, user
rating distributions, and presence of third-party tracking and adver-
tising libraries (Section 4). Third, we study their catalog similarities
and their publication dynamics, with emphasis on detecting the dis-
tribution of the presence of a given developer and app across stores
(Section 5). We then provide an in-depth analysis of malicious and
deceptive behaviors across app markets, discussing the presence of
fake and cloned apps, over-privileged apps, and malware (Section 6).
We conclude our paper with a discussion around the state of affairs
in the Chinese Android ecosystem, and its implications to users
and developers alike (Section 7).
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Our main research contributions are as follows:
• We conduct a comparative study of various intra- and inter-
market features. Our results reveal a long tail distribution of app
popularity, with the top 1% of apps usually accounting for over
80% of total downloads across the 17 studied markets. Further, we
observe the presence of heterogeneous behaviors across markets
(e.g., in terms of code maintenance and metadata consistency).
• We find that the set of third-party libraries (e.g., SDKs provided
by advertising and tracking services) embedded in Android apps
are different for those published in Chinese stores than in Google
Play. This observation could be explained by the inability to
access Google services such as Google Analytics and AdMob
from China, and Chinese developers’ need to monetize their apps
through services specialized in the Chinese market.
• Popular apps are more likely to be simultaneously published in
multiple markets compared to unpopular ones. However, there
is a strong market bias across developers: 1) 57% of Google Play
developers do not publish their apps on any of the Chinese mar-
kets, and 2) almost half of the Chinese-specific developers do not
publish apps in Google Play.
• We analyze the prevalence of various types of malicious behav-
iors in our dataset, specifically the presence of fake and cloned
apps, over-privileged apps, and malware. Google Play clearly out-
performs Chinese markets in all dimensions of our study thanks
to their positive efforts to eradicate these behaviors. Our results
reveal that the presence of malicious and repackaged apps in the
majority of Chinese app stores is significant and prevalent over
time (10%, on average, in the case of malware), in some cases
reaching almost 1 in 4 apps in the market.
• In order to estimate the extent to which app markets implement
security checks on submissions, we performed a second crawl
8 months after the first snapshot. Our exploration suggests that
over 84% of the potentially malicious apps found in Google Play
were removed. This differs considerably in the case of Chinese
markets, with malware removal ratios varying from 0.01% to
34.51% in the best case.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comparative study
between Google Play and alternative Chinese app stores at scale,
longitudinally and across various dimensions. Our results motivate
the need for more research efforts to illuminate the widely unex-
plored Chinese mobile and web ecosystem. We believe that our
efforts can positively contribute to bring user and developer aware-
ness, attract the focus of the research community and regulators,
and promote best operational practices across app store operators.
We have released our dataset, along with the experiment results, to
the research community at: http://market.orangeapk.com/
2 CHINESE ANDROID APP MARKETS
Due to the access restrictions of Google Play in China, Chinese
Android users resort to a large ecosystem of alternative third-party
Android appmarkets, which could be classified into three categories
according to their nature:
• Vendor-specific app markets. China has a vast and powerful
smartphone manufacturing industry with well-known vendors
such as Huawei, Xiaomi, and Lenovo. Almost every Chinese
smartphone vendor maintains its own app market, which also
comes pre-installed on their devices.
• Web companies. Chinese Internet giants such as 360, Baidu, and
Tencent also compete in the Chinese Android market with their
own app stores. These companies usually provide support to
some smartphone vendors behind the scenes. For example, the
Sony app store in China is powered by Baidu App Market, and
the Smartisan app store is supported by Tencent Myapp Market.
• Specializedmarkets.A number of relatively small Chinese com-
panies are specialized in Android app services. They usuallymake
profit through app promotion and other business-oriented part-
nerships with app developers/companies. For example, 25PP is
an Android app market powered by the PP smartphone assistant,
which is a popular management system app in China. Similarly,
Wandoujia is an app store provided by a company focused on
app recommendation, especially for mobile games.
In this study, we first resort to several independent industry
reports about app market ranking in China [3–5, 14, 29, 30]. We
cover all the top 10 Android markets in China, excluding the Vivo
market (ranks 6 to 10 in China), because the Vivo market does
not provide a web-based app download interface, which makes it
difficult for us to crawl the apps. Our list covers the app stores for
the top five smartphone vendors in China [27], three top Chinese
web companies, and eight popular specialized Android app markets.
The app markets in this list cover more than 98% of active users in
China [3, 29]. The majority of these markets target Chinese Android
users, but some of them operate at a global scale, particularly those
run by Android handset vendors. For example, Huawei’s appmarket
is also popular in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East [20].
2.1 Features of Chinese App Markets
In this section, we study some critical aspects and features across
app stores, including their openness to developers, their publication
and app auditing process, and their transparency, as shown in
Table 1. For that, we first registered a developer account for each
market and then manually examined their developer policies, terms
of service and other documents released by these markets [6, 8, 12,
13, 15–17, 21–25, 28, 33].
(1) Openness: Most Chinese app markets allow third-party devel-
opers to publish their apps for free2. However, a small number of
app stores enforce some limitations. For instance, Lenovo’s MM
market only allows registered companies to release apps [22],
whereas OPPO market only allows publishing apps falling in
specific categories, such as “wallpaper” and “theme” apps [25].
Vendor markets such as OPPO and Xiaomi force developers
to release apps that are fully compatible with their own de-
vices [25, 33]. Finally, App China explicitly limits an APK size
to 50 MB [13].
(2) Copyright checks: In order to limit the publication of fake
and cloned apps, all the Chinese markets but HiApk and PC
Online perform copyright ownership checks. Developers should
submit a “Software Copyright Certificate” indicating that they
are the original authors of the released apps.
(3) Publishing incentives: Chinese app stores provide a number
of incentive mechanisms for encouraging app developers to
2Google Play’s registration fee costs $25 [19].
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Table 1: Dataset size and market features for Google Play and the 16 Chinese markets studied in this paper.
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Google Play Official 2,031,946 193 B 538,283 57.04 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Hours ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Tencent Myapp Web Co. 636,265 82 B 294,950 10.61 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1 day ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Baidu Market Web Co. 227,454 94 B 107,698 15.10 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1-3 days ✓ ✓
360 Market Web Co. 163,121 50 B 90,226 6.80 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1 day ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
OPPO Market HW Vendor 426,419 57 B 209,197 14.37 Partial1 ✓ ✓ ✓ 1-3 days ✓ ✓
Xiaomi Market HW Vendor 91,190 - 55,669 5.78 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1-3 days ✓
MeiZu Market HW Vendor 80,573 19 B 50,451 0.58 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1-3 days ✓
Huawei Market HW Vendor 51,303 83 B 32,927 5.66 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 3-5 days ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Lenovo MM HW Vendor 37,716 24 B 24,565 0.79 ✓ ✓ ✓ 2 days ✓
25PP Specialized 1,013,208 56 B 470,073 19.06 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1-3 days ✓ ✓ ✓
Wandoujia Specialized 554,138 38 B 291,114 0.97 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1-3 days ✓ ✓
HiApk Specialized 246,023 17 B 115,191 3.65 ✓ N/A N/A N/A N/A
AnZhi Specialized 223,043 12 B 74,145 21.93 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1-3 days ✓
LIQU Specialized 179,147 26 B 101,336 6.10 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ N/A ✓
PC Online Specialized 134,863 0.2 B 65,225 2.58 ✓ N/A N/A N/A N/A
Sougou Specialized 128,403 3 B 66,759 4.04 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1 day ✓ ✓ ✓
App China Specialized 42,435 - 23,699 3.22 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1-3 days ✓
Total 6,267,247 754 B 1,035,992
publish their apps. These models could be classified into three
categories. The first one is “The Starting App and Exclusive
App Free Promotion”, a common mechanism across markets
which gives stores publication exclusivity for a period of time
in exchange for actively taking measures to promote the app,
typically during 24 hours. The second category is “High Qual-
ity App Free Promotion”. Some markets have a qualification
of high-quality apps. Apps that meet the criteria to obtain such
a qualification could request the markets to promote them for
free. The third category is “Editors’ Choice”, in which the
store recommends apps based on personal opinions.
(4) Auditing process: All app markets but HiApk and PC Online
indicate that apps are published after an inspection and vet-
ting process. Moreover, eight markets (Google Play, Tencent,
OPPO, Xiaomi, Meizu, Huawei, Anzhi and AppChina) claim to
incorporate human inspections attempting to complement the
automated auditing process. The general approach is to use au-
tomated security analysis tools first to identify possible threats3,
and then manually check the most suspicious submissions. For
example, a majority of the top apps in the Huawei market are
labeled with a sign indicating that they went through man-
ual inspection before being made publicly available, and it is
reported that Huawei has a large human inspection team [1].
Excluding HiApk and PC Online, Chinese alternative app stores
also explicitly check and report security issues on the apps (e.g.,
malware and aggressive adware). The inspection time varies
across markets, from several hours (Google Play) to roughly 5
days (Huawei market). 360 market requires all the developers
3Some web companies have released their own security analysis tools for Android
apps, e.g., 360 Mobile Security [7] and Baidu PhoneGuard [68, 69].
to use their packaging tool 360 Jiagubao [34] to obfuscate apps
before entering the market.
(5) App quality ratings: Only Tencent Myapp market and 360
market explicitly report that they rate the quality of published
apps based on downloads, user comments, developer level and
other metrics. For high quality apps, they could provide more
market resources (e.g., advertise them on the starting page) for
app promotion to attract high quality developers.
(6) Transparency:As opposed to Google Play, none of the Chinese
app markets require developers to publish their privacy policies
whenever they obtain and use sensitive user data. However,
nine markets (Google Play, Tencent Myapp, Baidu, 360, OPPO,
Huawei, 25PP, Sougou and AppChina) explicitly inform users
whether the apps contain advertisements. Only Google Play and
360 market report the presence of in-app purchases in the apps.
3 APK COLLECTION
We implemented a crawler to harvest APKs from Google Play and
the 16 alternative Chinese Android app stores listed in Table 1
in August 2017. For each app, we also collect publicly available
metadata as provided by the app stores, including, among others,
the app name, version name, app category, description, downloads,
ratings and release/update date.
We follow different strategies to crawl each market. In the case
of Google Play, we use a list of 1.5 million package names provided
by PrivacyGrade [78] as the searching seeds. We use a breadth-first-
search (BFS) approach to crawl (1) additional related apps recom-
mended for each one of our seeds by Google Play, and (2) other apps
released by the same developer. In order to avoid potential regional
bias, we instrumented our crawler to support both English and
Chinese languages. Chinese app markets index apps in different
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ways. Consequently, we adapt our crawler to the indexing behavior
of each Chinese app market. For instance, as of this writing, Baidu’s
app market indexes apps incrementally4.
We launched several crawlers in parallel via 50 Aliyun Cloud
Servers [37] between August 15 and August 30, 2017. However,
published Android apps can be updated by the developers at any
time, potentially affecting our analysis. To overcome this challenge,
we implement a “parallel search” strategy in our crawler. As long
as we identify a new app (based on its package name) in one of the
17 markets, we immediately search this app (using either the app
name or its package name, according to different markets) in all the
remaining markets to crawl it simultaneously if found. Note that
we will crawl all the listed searching results and add them to the
searching seeds. After roughly 8months, we launched a second, one-
week crawling campaign in April 30, 2018 for analyzing whether
any of the studied malicious apps has been removed from each
individual stores (Section 7).
3.1 Dataset
Table 1 reports the number of harvested APKs per store. We crawled
metadata for 6,267,247 different apps across all app stores, and
4,522,411 APK files. To the best of our knowledge, our dataset is
the largest cross-store APK collection obtained by the research
community. The mismatch between app metadata and APKs is
due to Google Play’s rate limiting mechanism, which limited our
APK collection efforts to a random sample of 287,110 of them. We
resorted to AndroZoo [11, 67] to obtain offline the APK files for
1,553,382 of the missing Google Play apps, using the package name
and version name as primary key. Note that, although this dataset
does not cover all the available apps in these markets due to the
limitation of our BFS app crawling method5, we believe that our
dataset has covered the most popular apps in both Google Play and
the Chinese markets. Further, due to the parallel search strategy,
the apps studied across markets will not bias the results.
4 GENERAL OVERVIEW
We now study high-level characteristics of Google Play and the 16
Chinese app stores. Using Google Play as a reference, we briefly
discuss differences along various dimensions such as catalog di-
versity, user downloads, Android API support, third-party libraries
and user ratings.
4.1 App Categories
App stores give app developers the freedom to publish their apps in
specific app categories. However, each Android market implements
a different taxonomy of apps. While Google Play defines 33 app cat-
egories (excluding game app subcategories), Huawei Market only
has 18 categories. In order to perform a fair comparison across mar-
kets, we manually develop a consolidated taxonomy containing 22
app categories, as shown in Figure 1. Due to the lack of enforcement
and lax supervision over the metadata provided by app developers,
4 We use the following syntax: http://shouji.baidu.com/software/INTEGER.html.
5As of this writing, the number of apps in Google Play is 2,893,556 [39], while we only
crawled roughly 70% of them.
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Figure 1: Distribution of app categories.
in Tencent, 360, OPPO, and 25PP markets, we classify 40% of the
apps from these stores as “Other” category6.
It is noticeable that Games account for roughly 50% of all apps
across markets, while other popular categories include Lifestyle
and Personalization. The least popular categories are Browsers,
InputMethods and Security tools. Note, also, how the distribution
of published apps across categories for the majority of Chinese app
stores follows closely Google Play’s distribution. A number of app
stores, especially vendor ones such as Meizu, Huawei and Lenovo’s,
present a different distribution of categories.
4.2 User Downloads
The majority of app stores report the actual number of user installs
per app while Google Play bins them into installation ranges (e.g.,
“50,000 - 100,000”). However, this metadata may not be consistent
across stores. Xiaomi and AppChina do not report this information
at all. Further, we suspect that some of the app stores might be
reporting the number of user downloads, likely higher than the
number of user installs, instead of user installs. For comparison
purposes and minimize bias, we normalize the number of user
installed apps for each app store (excluding Xiaomi and AppChina)
to Google Play’s ranges7.
As Table 1 reports, the apps in Google Play have 193 Billion ag-
gregated downloads8. No Chinese app store gets closer individually
to this volume despite the size of the Chinese market in terms of
user-base. However, the number of aggregated downloads across
all the 16 studied markets is three times higher than that of Google
6Apps published in these markets can report NULL or non-descriptive categories (e.g.,
“Unclassified”, “102229”).
7e.g., 75,123 after normalization becomes [50,000, 100,000].
8Estimated by considering the lower bound limit of Google Play’s install range.
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0-10 10-100 100-1K 1K-10K 10K-100K 100K-1M >1M
Google Play       4.05% 17.90% 30.52% 25.38% 15.15% 5.62% 1.21%
Tencent Myapp  55.87% 12.37% 15.50% 10.38% 4.21% 1.21% 0.35%
Baidu Market 0.00% 34.98% 25.91% 23.21% 7.65% 5.40% 2.26%
360 Market 16.54% 16.08% 19.25% 25.79% 12.78% 7.24% 1.97%
Huawei Market 0.10% 0.00% 38.05% 27.33% 17.64% 11.73% 4.16%
Xiaomi Market 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Wandoujia 1.96% 4.74% 43.66% 35.24% 12.17% 1.77% 0.38%
HiApk 0.00% 0.00% 78.24% 13.15% 5.93% 2.05% 0.53%
Anzhi Market 0.10% 1.35% 49.72% 42.83% 4.86% 0.84% 0.23%
OPPO Market 0.00% 0.00% 84.31% 10.47% 3.16% 1.55% 0.43%
25PP 0.27% 4.63% 68.02% 20.34% 4.82% 1.49% 0.37%
Sougou 0.77% 17.83% 55.13% 22.27% 2.51% 1.15% 0.31%
MeiZu Market 7.63% 13.50% 45.37% 19.54% 7.97% 4.28% 1.42%
LIQU 0.01% 0.03% 0.01% 71.83% 22.32% 5.14% 0.61%
App China 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Lenovo MM 0.04% 14.70% 0.00% 53.54% 16.78% 11.02% 3.19%
PC Online 13.07% 74.19% 8.62% 2.98% 0.91% 0.21% 0.02%
Figure 2: Distribution of downloads across markets.
Play. This figure shows the importance of Chinese Android markets
when aggregated.
The distribution of app downloads follows a power-law distribu-
tion, regardless of the app market, as shown in Figure 2. In general,
85% of the analyzed apps have less than 10K installs. However,
subtle differences arise when looking in detail on a per-store basis
after ranking the apps by their number of installs. On average, the
top 0.1% of the apps account for more than 50% of the total down-
loads, regardless of the app store. However, the top 0.1% of apps
published in Tencent MyApp account for more than 80% of the total
downloads while more than 55% of its published apps have almost
no downloads (< 10). On the other hand, 15% of the apps published
in vendor app stores like Huawei’s and Lenovo’s have more than
100K installs. This suggests that there are significant differences
in the popularity and quality of the apps published in certain app
stores, as we will investigate later.
4.3 Minimum API Level
Android app developers can declare in the app manifest the mini-
mum Android API level supported by their apps. This information
could offer insights about whether app developers are trying to
maximize app customers, or whether they try to target top-end
users. Figure 3 shows the distribution of minimum API level de-
clared for each app in each market. The result suggests that API
levels 7-9 (i.e., Android versions 2.1.x to 2.3.2) are the most widely
supported minimum API levels by the analyzed apps. However,
the percentage of apps in alternative Chinese markets supporting
low API levels is 3x higher than that of Google Play in general:
roughly 63% of apps in Chinese third-party markets support API
levels lower than 9, as opposed to 22% in the case of Google Play.
We further analyzed the release or update time of these apps
across markets. This is also a metric used for estimating whether
developers actively maintain their apps, a strong signal for code
quality [59, 66]. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the release/up-
date time of the apps in our dataset, as reported by the markets.
As we can see, roughly 90% of apps in Chinese alternative markets
were released/updated before 2017, while the number in Google
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Figure 4: Distribution of app release/update dates.
Play is 66%. Further, only 5% of apps published in Chinese stores
were updated/released within 6 months before launching our crawl-
ing campaign, while more than 23% of Google Play apps where
released during the same time frame. This finding suggests that
most of the apps published in Chinese markets likely support low
API-level as they were released years ago. These apps do not get
timely updates, hence likely exposing their user-base to various
security risks [59], and do not take advantage of features introduced
in newest Android versions.
4.4 Third-party Libraries
Third-party services form an integral part of the mobile ecosystem:
they ease app development and enable features such as analytics,
social network integration, and app monetization through adver-
tisements [79, 86, 88]. However, aided by the general opacity of
mobile systems, such services are also largely invisible to users,
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Figure 5: Presence of third-party libraries across app stores.
Table 2: Top 10 third-party libraries for Google Play and
Chinese markets apps. Chinese market specific libraries are
highlighted in the table.
Google Play
Package Name Type Usage (%)
com.google.android.gms Development 66.1
com.google.ads Advertisement 62.1
com.facebook Social Networking 21.5
org.apache Development 20.5
com.squareup Payment 13.8
com.google.gson Development 12.9
com.android.vending Payment 12.5
com.unity3d Game Engine 11.8
org.fmod Game Engine 9.6
com.google.firebase Development 9.0
Chinese Markets
com.google.ads Advertisement 25.7
org.apache Development 24.1
com.google.android.gms Development 20.5
com.tencent.mm Social Networking 17.3
com.baidu Development, Map 16.9
com.umeng Analytics, Advertisement 16.5
com.google.gson Development 16.3
com.alipay Payment 11.0
com.facebook Social Networking 10.7
com.nostra13 Development 10.6
hence causing potential privacy risks [43, 61, 72, 79, 81, 82, 88]. This
is aggravated by the lack of transparency enforcement across alter-
native app stores (Section 2): no alternative Chinese store requires
developers to publish a privacy policy, and only a handful of them
actively report the presence of ad services or in-app purchases in
published apps.
Although existing studies have created several tools or datasets
for third-party library detection [43, 65, 74, 80], they are either too
old or incomplete to fulfill our research purpose in this paper. For
example, LibRadar [70, 74] is a widely used and obfuscation-resilient
tool to identify third-party libraries used in Android apps. However,
it was created in 2016, and it relies on a feature dataset of libraries
extracted from Google Play apps. Considering that our apps are
crawled in August 2017, and most of our apps are from Chinese
markets, it may fail to report new libraries (or new versions) as
well as libraries specific to the Chinese market.
To this end, we have applied the clustering-based approach in-
troduced in LibRadar [74] to the 6 million apps we collected in this
paper, and build a new and complete feature dataset of third-party
libraries covering apps in both Google Play and the Chinese mar-
kets. At a result, we have created a dataset containing 5,102 libraries
with 672,052 different versions. We then manually examined the top
2,000 libraries and labeled them into different categories9. In order
to identify the company behind each one of them as well as the
purpose of the library, we search the unobfuscated package name
in Google, and refer to several sources, including AppBrain library
classification [39], PrivacyGrade classification [78], and Common
Library classification [65]. We group them in 5 different categories
by their purpose or offered service: ad network, analytics, social
networking, development tools, and payment.
As shown in Figure 5(a), the presence of third-party services
varies from app store to app store, yet it remains high: Google
Play has the highest presence of embedded third-party libraries in
their published apps (roughly 94% of published apps have a third-
party library) whereas PC Online presents the lowest penetration
(85% of published apps). Differences also appear in terms of the
total number of libraries per app when inspecting specific stores,
specially in vendor-provided app stores. While the average app
embeds more than 10 third-party libraries, those published in 360
market have 20 third-party libraries embedded on average. This
number contrasts significantly with the 8 libraries found in average
for Google Play apps.
Most Popular Third-party Libraries. Table 2 lists the top 10
third-party libraries found for apps published in Google Play and
all Chinese markets, respectively. Google-related libraries used for
advertisement and analytics services dominate in Google Play: they
can be found in more than 60% of published apps. It is interest-
ing to see that, although Google services are blocked in China,
Google-related libraries can be also found in Chinese markets, with
more than a quarter of apps in Chinese markets embedding Google-
related advertising libraries [79, 86]. We further explored these
9Note that for libraries with multiple versions, we only need to label one of them.
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Figure 6: Distribution of app ratings across markets.
apps and identified two leading reasons for this. The first reason
is that most of these apps do not release Chinese-specific versions.
This implies that the subset of applications relying on Google Ser-
vices found on alternative Chinese app stores are identical to those
present in Google Play. The second reason is that some markets
crawl apps in Google Play to enlarge their application catalog: more
than 30,000 apps published in Baidu market are explicitly labeled
as crawled from Google Play in the developer name field. Never-
theless, we found many instances of third-party libraries specific
to the Chinese market across app stores. For instance, instead of
Facebook’s GRAPHAPI [18], more than 17.3% of the apps published
in Chinese markets embed Tencent Wechat library [32], a popular
Chinese social networking SDK. Alipay (a payment SDK) and Baidu
(a library for development also offering map support) are also used
by more than 10% of the apps published in Chinese markets, hence
replacing Google vending and Google Maps, respectively.
Advertising libraries. Identifying advertising libraries is a non-
trivial task, as suggested by previous studies [53, 71, 75]. We lever-
age AppBrain and Common Library classification [65] to identify
and classify third-party ad libraries. We have manually labeled 282
advertisement-specific libraries (with 56,011 versions) in total. As
shown in Figure 5(b), around 70% of the apps published in Google
Play use any of the labeled ad libraries, while 53.2% of apps in Chi-
nese markets use at least one ad library. It is worth mentioning that
Google AdMob dominates Google Play with roughly 90% of the ad-
vertisement market share, while the Chinese mobile ad ecosystem
is more decentralized. Google AdMob and Umeng are the two most
popular ad libraries, accounting for 80% of the mobile ad market
share in China, while more than 200 ad libraries compete for the
remaining 20% of the market.
4.5 App Ratings
We conclude our app store comparison with a brief analysis of how
users rate published apps. The rating scores are crawled from app
markets. Note that if an app does not receive any rating score, we
set it as 0 by default. Figure 6 shows the CDF of app ratings for all
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Figure 7: CDF of developer published markets.
the considered markets. The distribution shows that app ratings
vary greatly across Chinese markets but it is possible to identify
two clear patterns:
• Pattern #1:More than 80% of apps in Chinese third-party app
markets do not receive user ratings at all, around 90% of these
apps have less than 1,000 downloads. This pattern can be found
in 25PP, OPPO and Tencent Myapp markets. This trend indicates
that most of the apps published in these markets are low-quality
and unpopular Android apps – a trend in-line with the app down-
load distribution shown in Figure 2.
• Pattern #2: Finally, we notice that the distribution for several
markets (e.g., PC Online in the bottom) contains many apps with
ratings between 2.5 and 3 out of 5.We tried to upload some testing
apps to PC Online and found that they use a default rating of 3,
instead of a default rating 0, which could be the reason leading
to this distribution.
Google Play, instead, presents a pattern completely different to that
of any Chinese app market: only 9.3% of Google Play apps have not
been rated by users, while more than 50% of them have received
ratings higher than 4.
5 PUBLISHING DYNAMICS
In this section, we investigate the publishing dynamics of app de-
velopers. We focus on analyzing the publishing distribution for
each developer and app across each store10. We define “single-
store” released apps as those available only in a single market of
our dataset; otherwise, we label them as “multi-store” apps. Note
that it is possible that the “single-store” app would appear in other
markets that are not covered in this paper. This, however, does not
affect our comparative study.
5.1 App Developers
Android mobile apps must be signed with a developer key before
being released. We used the tool ApkSigner [9] to extract the app
developer signature present on each APK. This metadata, embedded
10We identify unique apps across markets based on their package names (or app ID).
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Figure 8: CDF of apps vs. (a) number of different versions (b) cluster size, and (c) number of developers.
on each executable, cannot be spoofed or modified by malicious
actors11. We identified slightly over 1 million app developers – all
of them with different signatures – in our dataset, as summarized
in Table 1.
Our analysis reveals that app developers follow different pub-
lishing strategies by targeting app stores and users in different
ways. More than half of the developers release their apps in Google
Play, and around 48% of them focus solely on Chinese alternative
markets. Out of these developers found on Google Play, 57% of
them do not release their apps in Chinese markets, possibly due
to language barriers or a lack of understanding of the fragmented
Chinese ecosystem.
Figure 7 shows the CDF of the number of app markets targeted
by each app developer. Around 20% of the app developers publish
their apps in more than 3 app stores simultaneously, but only a few
of them (just 696) roll out their apps in the 17 markets simultane-
ously. It is interesting to note that over 10% of the developers target
exclusively one single Chinese store. This trend is more prevalent
for those markets with a larger app catalog (e.g., Tencent and 25PP),
which also offer incentives to app developers for the exclusive
publishing rights of their software.
5.2 Single- and Multi-store Apps
Single-store Apps.More than 77% of the apps published in Google
Play are single-store ones. This result is expected, as Google Play
has a global presence and its catalog has far more apps than any
other market individually. On average, 11% of the apps published in
alternative Chinese app stores are single-store, though this figure
varies across stores. For example, while AnZhi, OPPO and 25PP
have over 20% of single-store apps, both Wandoujia and Meizu
markets have less than 1% of single-released apps. A manual inspec-
tion of the apps exclusively published in Meizu reveals that they
are popular apps explicitly developed for Meizu-branded handsets
(e.g.,com.meizu.flyme.wallet and com.meizu.media.reader).
Multi-store Apps. Between 20% and 30% of the apps published
in Chinese alternative markets are also present in Google Play.
The analysis also indicates that many Chinese markets share a
significant fraction of their app catalogs: for instance, 80% of the
apps published in 25PP are also released in Huawei, Wandoujia,
11We found that one developer (with the same signature) may correspond to multiple
names across markets with slight variations, e.g., Chinese name vs. English name.
Meizu and Lenovo markets. This trend is also present among the
top 1% most popular apps (by downloads) for each market: over
80% of the top 1% most popular apps are shared across all Chinese
markets. Catalog similarities between top apps in Chinese stores
and Google Play are, instead, low. This finding confirms that many
developers target exclusively Chinese app stores.
5.3 IDE and App Store Introduced Biases
The previous method offers an upper-bound estimation of catalog
overlaps between stores. However, an important remaining ques-
tion is: are two apps with the same package name and app version
identical? An alternative and stricter method to identify whether
two apps are identical is comparing the hash (e.g., MD5) of their APK
contents. This method allowed us to find a total number of 546,703
apps in our dataset with identical package names, version code
and developer but different MD5. For instance, we have 14 differ-
ent hashes for the app com.kugou.android v8.7.0. After manually
inspecting their DEX files (i.e., main function code), we conclude
that those apps are identical: the only difference between them
is their META-INF/kgchannel file12. This confirms that relying on
the package name, version number and developer signature are
sufficient to accurately identify similar apps despite these subtle dif-
ferences. Finally, we also identify instances of app store-introduced
differences resulting from stores forcing app developers to follow
certain requirements prior to publication. A notable case is 360
market, which requires developers to obfuscate their apps with 360
Jiagubao before uploading it to the app store [34].
5.4 Outdated Apps
Another reason potentially preventing us from identifying multi-
store released apps are unsynchronized roll-outs of new app ver-
sions across stores. We now relax the condition to identify two
identical apps: we only consider the app package name and devel-
oper signature, excluding the app version13. As shown in Figure 8(a),
roughly 14% of apps have simultaneously published multiple ver-
sions in different stores, up to 14 different versions in extreme cases.
12The META-INF/kgchannel files/directories are created, recognized and interpreted
by the Java 2 Platform to configure apps, extensions, class loaders and services. The
main purpose of them is to differentiate the source of app users (i.e., from which market
the app is installed).
13We assume that app version numbers are assigned incrementally regardless of app
stores.
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Figure 9: A comparison of app updates across markets.
Because we use a “parallel search” strategy in our crawler (Sec-
tion 3), the elapsed time between all crawls for a given app across
markets is in the order of a few minutes, so those are intentional
actions or poor software maintenance practices of the developers.
This behavior is not limited to poorly maintained unpopular apps.
Figure 9 details the overall distribution of outdated apps across
app stores. Note that for this analysis we exclude single-store apps
which are always updated by definition. Besides unfixed bugs and
potential vulnerabilities, publicly available outdated apps also hin-
der users from enjoying newly added features. This can decrease
the perceived quality of the apps, and overall hurts the brand equity
of the market. This observation suggests that developers may pri-
oritize roll-outs in specific app stores. Google Play has the highest
version number across all app stores: 95.4% of the apps published
there have the highest app version number. This is not the case for
stores like Lenovo MM and Baidu markets, where more than 39%
of their apps might be outdated according to their version number.
6 DEVELOPER MISBEHAVIORS
In this section, we study the prevalence of various types of malicious
behaviors across markets. Specifically, we study the presence of fake
apps, cloned apps, over-privileged apps, andmalware. The differences
between fake and cloned apps are subtle but substantial. Malicious
developers can release fake apps that masquerade as the legitimate
one but stealthily perform malicious actions on the user’s device.
We define those as “fake apps” [103]. We consider “cloned apps” as
those that are the results of repackaging legitimate ones [89].
6.1 Fake Apps
We exploit the fact that fake apps usually try to emulate the app
name of a legitimate one, but are published with different package
names [38, 63]. We applied a clustering-based method to efficiently
identify fake apps at scale. First, we build a cluster enforcing a strict
matching of app names. As shown in Figure 8(b), around 22% of the
apps in our dataset share the same name with at least another app,
all of them with different package names, either in the same or in a
different store. Not all the identified apps are necessarily fake, as
developers may have legitimate reasons for releasing different apps
(package names) with the same app name. This is the case of: 1) apps
sharing common names like Flashlight, Calculator, or Wallpaper;
Table 3: Fake and cloned apps across stores. SB and CB stand
for Signature-Based and Code-Based clones, respectively.
Clones
Market Fake (%) SB (%) CB (%)
Google Play 0.03 4.01 17.82
Tencent Myapp 0.53 8.24 22.73
Baidu Market 0.48 10.98 17.38
360 Market 0.50 5.43 23.26
Huawei Market 0.33 11.54 18.76
Xiaomi Market 0.0 8.00 20.11
Wandoujia 0.39 5.98 21.23
HiApk 0.64 7.51 20.08
AnZhi Market 0.57 4.92 20.71
OPPO Market 0.38 5.85 20.94
25PP 0.35 7.16 24.08
Sougou 1.83 4.86 18.28
MeiZu Market 1.14 6.65 18.42
LIQU 0.40 5.32 16.68
App China 0.0 10.17 13.23
Lenovo MM 0.67 7.81 16.37
PC Online 1.89 8.60 23.34
Average 0.60 7.24 19.61
and 2) apps released by the same developer with different package
names for different platforms14.
To this end, we applied a heuristic rule to remove legitimate
clusters. Generally, the apps in a cluster include different developer
signatures. By manually analyzing 100 randomly selected clusters
of different size, we found out that 83% of fake apps form small
clusters (size < 5 with uncommon names) of unpopular ones (i.e.,
downloads ≤ 1, 000) and a popular one with more than 1 million
installs (the official app). Table 3 summarizes the percentage of
fake apps identified in each market using this heuristic. The result
suggests that fake apps are present in all app stores, including
Google Play. Nevertheless, Meizu, PC Online and Sougou stores
have a percentage of fake apps above the average. Note that our
heuristic is straightforward yet very effective in identifying apps
that use similar names to camouflage as the official apps.
The largest number of fake apps in absolute terms correspond to
25PP and Tencent Myapp, with 3,591 and 3,347 apps, respectively.
Relative to the market size, PC Online (with 1.89%) and SouGou
(1.83%) lead the ranking of markets with higher presence of fake
apps. Overall, our results suggest that many app markets do not
take enough efforts to identify and remove fake apps, despite all
of them–but PC Online and HiApk– requesting copyright checks
and performing app auditing before publication (Section 2). While
we did not identify any fake app in Xiaomi and App China, Google
Play presents a marginal number of fake apps (572 in total).
6.2 Cloned Apps
Cloned apps often share a large portion of the metadata with the
original app, but they are obviously signed by different developers.
We explored the prevalence of cloned apps using two separate strate-
gies: a signature-based approach (which aims at identifying apps
with the same package name but different developer signatures)
and a code-based approach (i.e., apps with high code similarity
14e.g., com.sogou.map.android.maps and com.sogou.map.android.maps.pad are
two different versions of Sogou Map.
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but different package names). However, we are also interested in
identifying the source market in which the original app has been
published. As it is non-trivial to identify the original app given a
pair of cloned apps [56, 101], we resort to a heuristic approach to
solve this: the app with more downloads is regarded as the original
one. Unfortunately, this may generate false positives as it may be
possible for the cloned app to have more installs than its original
version. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge the research
community has not developed a more accurate method to solve this
problem [51, 89, 101].
Signature-based clones. As in the previous section, we first clus-
ter all the apps by their package name and then compare the app
developer signatures for each cluster. We consider that two apps
are clones if they share the same package name but do not have a
common developer signature. Since package names are supposed
to distinctively identify an Android app, it is expected that they
should be unique across different Android markets and that they
are signed with the same developer key.
Figure 8(c) shows the distribution of apps with respect to the
number of developer signatures obtained in a cluster. Overall, 12%
of apps have at least 2 clones released by different developers. For
example, the app com.dino.dinosuperapp has been published in
15 different markets by 11 different developers. To better under-
stand the nature of these clones, we manually examined 100 ran-
domly selected pairs of signature-based clones. In all cases, we
observed that clones are actually repackaged apps, i.e., apps cre-
ated by disassembling the original app, making modifications, and
finally reassembling the resulting code into a different app. Even
if we cannot cover all cases manually, our analysis suggests that
there are no legitimate reasons behind these identified clones.
Code-based clones. Since cloned apps can also modify the pack-
age name, we implemented a different approach based on analyzing
code similarity to identify cloned apps. Previous work has pro-
posed different approaches for app repackaging detection [51, 52,
58, 99, 101, 102]. In this paper, our implementation is based on
WuKong [89], which proved to be an accurate and scalable two-
phase approach for app clone detection. We first extracted Android
API calls, Intents, and Content Providers for each app and created
a feature vector per app with more than 45K dimensions. We then
used a variant of the Manhattan distance to measure the similarity
between each pair of vectors. Specifically, for n-dimensional feature
vectors A and B, their distance is given by
distance(A,B) =
∑n
i=0 |Ai − Bi |∑n
i=0 (Ai + Bi )
.
If the resulting distance between the computed vectors for a pair of
apps exceeds a certain threshold – we experimentally selected a con-
servative threshold of 0.05, which corresponds to a 95% similarity
– and they are signed with different signatures, we consider these
two apps as potential clones. For those apps flagged as potential app
clones, we performed a second code-level comparison to refine the
results as introduced by WuKong. In this second step, we consider
two apps to be clones when they share more than 85% of the code
segments. Due to space limitations, we omit the implementation
details here.
Previous work has suggested that, on average, more than 60%
of an app’s code come from third-party libraries [89]. This figure
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Figure 10: Intra- and inter-market app clones.
is relevant for our analysis since libraries may cause both false
positives and false negatives when detecting code clones [65]. To
overcome this limitation, we leveraged LibRadar [70, 74] to identify
and eliminate the impact of third-party libraries on our code-based
app clone study.
Results. Table 3 summarizes the distribution of signature- and
code-based clones for eachmarket. Code-based clones (roughly 20%)
are generally more common than signature-based clones (roughly
10%). This result is in line with figures reported in previous work [89,
102] and suggests that attackers are more interested in advanced
cloning methods that go beyond changing app package names and
manipulating the code. We further illustrate the source market
of cloned cases in the heatmap rendered in Figure 10. Both intra-
market and inter-market clones are considered 15. For each cell
(row X, column Y), the color represents the number of cloned apps
in market Y that were originally published in market X. Google
Play is the premier source for cloning apps: it presents the large
number of apps being cloned into Chinese markets. We can also
detect interesting trends when looking at the destination of these
apps. Market 25PP has the largest number of cloned apps, which
are mainly copied from Google Play, followed by Tencent Myapp
and Wandoujia. Surprisingly, intra-market clones are also quite
common in addition to inter-market clones. As shown in Figure 10,
more than 181,677 apps in 25PP market have similar apps to those
originally from the same market.
6.3 Over-privileged Apps
Previous studies [41, 54] have analyzed the gap between requested
permissions and those actually used by Android apps. An app is
said to be “over-privileged” when it requests more permissions
15Only code-based clones are presented as signature-based clones do not involve any
intra-market clones.
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Figure 11: Distribution of over-privileged apps in Google
Play and Chinese markets. The triangle symbol represents
the value for Google Play, while the box-plots represent the
values across the 16 Chinese alternative stores.
(listed in the AndroidManifest.xml) than those actually used in their
functionalities. Previous work [97] has suggested that more than
85% of Android apps published in vendor-customized phones suffer
from this issue. Since permissions constitute an explicit declaration
of what sensitive resources an app will use [91, 93], over-privileging
an app is undesirable because: (i) it is a violation of the principle of
least privilege [2]; (ii) it exposes users to unnecessary permission
warnings; and (iii) it increases the attack surface [44] and the impact
of the presence of a bug or vulnerability [54].
Intuitively, this gap can be identified first by building a permis-
sion map that identifies what sensitive permissions are needed for
each API call/Intent/Content Provider, and using static analysis
to determine what permission-related invocations an app makes.
Then, we can compare the actually used permissions by the app
with the requested permissions listed in AndroidManifest.xml. To
do this, we leveraged data provided by PScout [26, 41], specifically a
list of 32,445 permission-related APIs, 97 permission-related Intents,
78 Content Providers URI Strings, and 996 Content Provider URI
fields16.
In general terms, apps published in Chinese markets tend to
request more sensitive permissions, i.e., those labeled as dangerous
by Google [10], than Google Play apps. Figure 11 shows the dis-
tribution of over-privileged apps across markets grouped by how
many permissions in excess each app has. Note that, in general,
Chinese markets contain more over-privileged apps than Google
Play. Approximately 65% of the apps in Google Play are over-
privileged, while the percentage in Chinese markets is roughly 82%.
In two particular cases (25PP and App China), more than 95% of
apps requested at least one unused permission. Apps often request
no more than 10 unused permissions, 3 being the most common
value. The most common over-privileged sensitive permissions are
16Note that we use the API-Permission mapping for Android 5.1.1, which may not
reflect the new sensitive APIs introduced in subsequent system versions. However,
more than 90% of apps in our dataset target API levels less than 5.1. In addition, a
well-known limitation of static over-privilege app analysis is its inability to handle
Java reflection and dynamic code loading [90].
Table 4: Percentage of apps labeled as malware in each mar-
ket by AV-rank.
AV-rank (% apps)
Market >= 1 >= 10 >= 20
Google Play 17.03 2.09 0.32
Tencent Myapp 34.15 11.16 3.45
Baidu Market 42.77 12.24 3.30
360 Market 41.40 12.35 3.10
OPPO Market 42.97 16.43 6.00
Xiaomi Market 55.11 9.12 1.82
MeiZu Market 51.40 10.70 3.14
Huawei Market 57.48 4.71 0.57
Lenovo MM 54.20 7.53 1.52
25PP 32.36 8.26 2.06
Wandoujia 31.99 7.98 2.19
HiApk 41.89 11.12 2.72
AnZhi Market 55.32 11.37 2.41
LIQU 45.91 13.00 4.27
PC Online 55.93 24.01 8.37
Sougou 52.41 16.53 4.59
App China 48.55 14.13 4.27
Average 36.49 12.30 3.69
READ_PHONE_STATE (52.38%), ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
(36.28%), ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION (33.83%), and CAMERA (19.98%).
6.4 Malware Prevalence
In order to investigate the presence of malicious and undesirable
apps in our dataset, we uploaded all the apps to VirusTotal [31], an
online analysis service that aggregates more than 60 anti-virus en-
gines, which is widely adopted by the research community. Previous
studies [40, 96] have suggested that some anti-virus engines may
not always report reliable results. In order to deal with such poten-
tial false positives, we analyzed the results grouped by how many
engines (AV-rank) flag a sample as malware. Previous work have
argued that a threshold of 10 engines is a robust choice [40, 61, 100].
Overall Result. Table 4 shows the overall detection results.
Remarkably, roughly 50% of the apps in Chinese markets are flagged
at least by one anti-virus engine, while the percentage for Google
Play is considerably lower (17.03%). According to the threshold of
“AV−rank ≥ 10”, around 2% of the apps inGoogle Play are labeled as
malware, while the percentage in Chinese markets is much higher.
In fact, for 11 out of the 16 Chinese markets the percentage of
malware exceeds 10%. A particularly remarkable case is the PC
Online market, with more than 24% of its apps labeled as potentially
malicious. In absolute terms, Tencent and 25PP markets host the
largest number of malicious apps (70,988 and 83,655, respectively).
On the opposite side, we find Huawei’s market, with a figure (4.71%)
comparable in magnitude to that of Google Play (2.09%).
Top Malware. Table 5 lists the top 10 malicious apps accord-
ing to their AV-Rank. Note that two of them (com.trustport.
mobilesecurity_eicar_test_file and com.zoner.android.eicar)
correspond to the AV benchmarking apps developed by the Eu-
ropean Institute for Computer Antivirus Research (EICAR). The
remaining apps–and others that were manually inspected by us–
clearly show potentially malicious behaviors. For example, com.
ypt.merchant, published in 5 markets, poses itself as a legitimate
mobile point-of-sale (mPOS) for merchants and individuals.
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Table 5: Top 10 malicious apps by their AV-rank.
Package Name
(malware family) AV-Rank Markets
com.trustport.mobilesecurity
_eicar_test_file (eicar) 48 Wandoujia, 25PP
games.hexalab.home (mofin) 47 LIQU
com.wb.gc.ljfk.baidu (ramnit) 47 Baidu, HiAPK
com.ypt.merchant (ramnit) 46 Tencent, Wandoujia,OPPO, 25PP, LIQU
com.wsljtwinmobi (ramnit) 46 Tencent, 25PP
com.wb.gc.ljfk.tx (ramnit) 45 Tencent
com.wgljd (ramnit) 45 Tencent, 360
com.zoner.android.eicar (eicar) 44 Google Play,Wandoujia, 25PP
com.zhiyun.cnhyb.activity (ramnit) 44 Baidu
com.fai.shuiligongcheng (ramnit) 44 25PP
RepackagedMalware. The Android Genome Project [103] sug-
gested that app repackaging is the main way for malware distribu-
tion, and 86% of the 1,260 samples are repackaged malware. How-
ever, this dataset is outdated (collected in 2011) and the number
of samples is relatively small so it may no longer provide a repre-
sentative picture of the current Android malware landscape. Thus,
we further analyzed how many malware samples in our dataset
are repackaged apps. To this end, we merged the malware results
with the app clone detection results as shown in Section 6.2, and
observed that only 38.3% of these malware samples are repackaged
apps. This result suggests that app repackaging is no longer the
main way for malware spreading. We believe this is an interest-
ing observation for our community, and we leave to future work
analyzing the newest trends in malware spreading strategies.
Malware Family.We further analyzed the distribution of mal-
ware families across Google Play and Chinese markets. To do this,
we used AVClass [83] to obtain the family name (label) of each iden-
tified malware. Figure 12 shows the distribution top 20 malware
families. An interesting finding is that the distribution of malware
families differs greatly between Google Play and Chinese markets.
The most popular malware family in Chinese markets is kuguo
(12.69%), while it only corresponds to 0.6% of malware in Google
Play. Roughly, 45% of the malware present in Google Play belong
to the family airpush (29.04%) and revmob (15.09%). We further
enlarged our threshold to “AV −rank ≥ 20” and found that it shows
generally similar malware family distribution.
7 POST-ANALYSIS
All markets have strict policies to conduct copyright and security
checks (Section 2). Yet our results reveal that they still host a signif-
icant amount of fake and cloned apps, as well as malware samples.
As introduced in Section 3, we performed a second crawl for each
app store about 8 months after the first one in order to quantify
whether the stores made any effort to remove those samples from
their catalogs17. As shown in the first column of Table 6, over 84%
of the potential malicious apps found in Google Play have been
removed. However, the percentages of malware removal in Chi-
nese alternative markets vary from 0.01% (PC Online) to 34.51%
17We exclude HiAPk from this analysis as it has discontinued its services by the end
of 2017. In addition, OPPO can only be accessed now using their market app.
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Play and Chinese markets.
Table 6: Percentage of removed malware across markets.
The third column indicates the number of apps also pub-
lished and removed in Google Play (GPRM).
Market %MalwareRemoved
#Overlapped
with GPRM %Removed
Google Play 84% - -
Tencent Myapp 8.75% 7,157 3.1%
Baidu Market 23.99% 1,422 34.53%
360 43% 1,198 34.22%
Xiaomi 32.50% 636 31.13%
Meizu 29.18% 668 26.20%
Huawei 26.92% 169 23.08%
Lenovo MM 22.75% 263 16.35%
25PP 19.63% 7,804 17.31%
Wandoujia 34.51% 5,289 44.74%
AnZhi 27.61% 632 25.78%
LIQU 14.08% 1,878 11.18%
PC Online 0.01% 1,117 0.00%
Sougou 24.24% 1,082 22.00%
App China 20.51% 546 30.24%
(Wandoujia). We extracted and inspected in detail those apps with
an AV-rank ≥ 10 removed from Google Play (GPRM) between our
crawls. 11,623 of them were also found in at least one Chinese app
store, and over 70% of them are still hosted by at least one Chinese
market by the end of April 2018, as shown in the fourth column of
Table 6. Tencent and PC Online are clearly the Chinese stores in
which those potentially malicious apps still survive.
8 DISCUSSION
Our results reveal that potentially malicious and deceptive activ-
ities are more common in Chinese markets than in Google Play.
Figure 13 presents a multi-dimensional comparison of four repre-
sentative Chinese app markets and Google Play. Tencent Myapp,
one of the largest Chinese app stores by their aggregate number
of downloads, hosts a significant amount of mobile malware. This
store seems to be more indulgent with malicious developers, in-
cluding those publishing malware as well as fake and cloned apps.
Although Tencent Store claims to perform manual inspection for all
the submitted apps, our empirical observations seem to contradict
it. We find a similar behavior for PC Online. However, in this case
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Figure 13: Multi-dimensional comparison of Google Play,
Tencent, PC Online, Huawei and Lenovo markets. For each
metric, we normalize it to the scale [0, 100], and the center
represents 0.
we could not find any developer policy describing security checks
on apps prior to publication.
Huawei and Lenovo markets show a clearly different behavior.
These stores publish popular apps and present similar app ratings
and download distributions. They also seem to have strict mech-
anisms to prevent malware distribution: only 4.71% and 7.53% of
their apps, respectively were labeled as malware, figures compara-
ble in magnitude to that of Google Play. The purpose of the stores
and their market segment can also influence in the presence of
malware, possibly due to their need to protect their brand reputa-
tion. Lenovo’s MM market does not allow individual developers to
publish apps, a practice that could help them mitigate the spread
of malware and low-quality apps. However, Huawei and Lenovo
markets still have a significant number of outdated apps, which
could hinder users from enjoying newly added features and other
app improvements (e.g., bug fixing). This practice could contribute
to decrease the perceived quality of the apps, hurting as a result
the brand equity of the app store.
9 RELATEDWORK
Previous research efforts have performed large-scale mobile app
analysis [35, 45, 47, 50, 55, 85]. However, alternative Android mar-
kets have not been well studied by the research community yet.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the largest and most
exhaustive comparative analysis made between the official Google
Play store and Chinese alternative markets.
Large-scale App Repositories. AndroZoo [67] is an academic
effort focused on compiling a large-scale dataset of APKs. This
research effort has enabled a number of studies focusing on mali-
cious practices and privacy risks of Android apps [42, 48, 64, 98].
AndroZoo uses purpose-built crawlers to harvest more than 5M
APKs from 12 app stores and 5 Chinese markets with roughly 1.5
Million apps. The work of Ishii et al. [62] is the closest to ours.
They investigated 4.7M Android apps covering 27 app markets,
mainly obtained from AndroZoo [11], to understand the security
management of global third-party markets.
Measurement of Google Play. Many research efforts have
been focused on Google Play. PlayDrone [87] also performed a
large-scale characterization of 1.1 million apps published in Google
Play. They explored various issues such as app evolution and authen-
tication schemes. Bogdan et al. [49] analyzed 160,000 Google Play
apps daily for a period of 6 months, aiming to summarize the tem-
poral patterns. Ali et al. [36] quantitatively compared app market
attributes (e.g., ratings and prices) of Apple store and Google Play
based on 80,000 app pairs. Wang et al. [92] presented a large-scale
study of 791,138 removed Google Play apps to identify potential
reasons for app removal. Wang et al. [94] analyzed the mobile app
ecosystem from the perspective of app developers based on over
1.2 million apps and 320,000 developers.
Measurement of Alternative Markets. For third-party mar-
kets, Petsas et al. [77] analyzed 4 alternative markets to understand
the downloading patterns and popularity trends. Ng et al. [76] as-
sessed the trustworthy level of 20 Chinese app markets, but they
only studied roughly 500 apks. Wang et al. [95] have studied gam-
ing apps across 4 Chinese markets to understand their scale and
evolution. WuKong [89] was proposed to identify repackaged apps
in five Chinese app markets.
10 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have conducted a large-scale mobile app analysis to
understand various features of several Chinese Android app stores
and how they compare to Google Play. Specifically, our analysis
covers over 6 million Android apps obtained from 16 Chinese app
markets and Google Play. Overall, our results suggest that there
are substantial differences between the Chinese app ecosystem and
Google Play, though some minor commonalities are also found. We
have identified a significant number of developers and third-party
services specialized in the Chinese market. We have also found a
higher prevalence of fake, cloned, and malicious apps in Chinese
stores than in Google Play, possibly due to market operators indul-
gently oversighting copyright and security checks over the apps.
We believe that our research efforts can positively contribute to
bring user and developer awareness, attract the focus of the re-
search community and regulators, and promote best operational
practices across app store operators.
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